In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0209
FILED 5-14-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD41866
The Honorable Marischa Gilla, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Edward A., Phoenix
Appellant

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Thomas K. Sanders
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Edward A. (“Father”)1 appeals the termination of his parental
rights to J.G. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding
the [superior] court’s order.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz.
547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).

¶3 Father and Shaquier G. (“Mother”)2 are the biological parents
of J.G., born in January 2021. In April 2022, the Department of Child Safety
(“DCS”) filed a dependency petition against Mother, alleging J.G. was
dependent due to abuse or neglect.

¶4 DCS did not identify Father in its original dependency
petition. About a week later, DCS filed an amended petition that identified
Father and alleged J.G. was dependent as to Father because he failed to
provide for J.G.’s basic needs and had not established paternity or assumed
parental responsibility. Father’s paternity test later established he is J.G.’s
father.

¶5 Mother concealed J.G. from DCS, so DCS did not take custody
of J.G. until August 2022. A month later, the superior court found J.G.
dependent as to Mother and Father. Father did not contest the dependency.

¶6 DCS received reports Father committed domestic violence
against two former partners and Mother. The same month DCS took
custody of J.G., DCS asked Father to self-refer to domestic violence
counseling. Father began domestic violence counseling more than a year
later when he completed intake and one session, but missed the next five
sessions.

¶7 DCS referred Father to a parenting skills program, provided
visitation, and asked him to complete drug testing. Father attended some

1 Father’s assigned counsel filed a brief avowing he reviewed the record and

found no non-frivolous issue to raise. We ordered assigned counsel remain
appointed as advisory counsel, and Father filed a pro se brief.

2 Mother is also known as Shaqvier G. The superior court also terminated
Mother’s parental rights, but she is not a party to this appeal.

2
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

sessions but failed to complete the parenting program. Father began
supervised visitation with J.G. in September 2022. Four months later, DCS
authorized unsupervised visitation. Father participated in visitation until
March 2023, when DCS received a report that Father allowed Mother to see
J.G. during a visit. DCS had informed Father that Mother was not allowed
contact with J.G. unless DCS supervised her. DCS reinstated supervised
visitation, and Father stopped visiting J.G. Father’s drug tests were
negative, and DCS did not request additional testing.

¶8 In July 2023, DCS moved to change the case plan from
reunification to severance and adoption. The superior court granted DCS’s
motion. Later that month, DCS petitioned to terminate Father’s parental
rights on six- and nine-month out-of-home placement grounds. The court
held a one-day contested severance hearing in October 2023.

¶9 At the contested severance hearing, Father testified he could
not find a domestic violence counseling provider that took his insurance,
and he missed his counseling sessions because his phone would not connect
to the virtual meetings. He denied committing domestic violence against
Mother but admitted he went to jail for domestic violence against a former
partner. He also denied allowing Mother to see J.G. and said he stopped
visiting J.G. because he was “upset” with DCS. The DCS case manager
testified Father’s participation in some services was “very inadequate,” and
he refused to participate in other services. Father’s parenting program
practitioner testified he missed eleven of his eighteen sessions, she saw no
demonstrative changes in his behavior, and his assessment scores declined
during the program.

¶10 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court
found termination was in J.G.’s best interests and terminated Father’s
parental rights on both grounds alleged.

¶11 We have jurisdiction over Father’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1), and Rule
601 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Father’s opening brief does not comply with rules requiring
citations to legal authority and the record. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 607(b);
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). We could conclude Father waived his arguments, see
State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452, ¶ 101 n.9 (2004), but we choose to address
the merits.

3
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

I. Nine-Month Out-of-Home Placement Ground

¶13 To terminate parental rights, a court must find clear and
convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)
and find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246,
249, ¶ 12 (2000); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). Because
the superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,”
Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation
omitted), we will accept its factual findings if supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences, and we will affirm the order terminating parental
rights unless it is clearly erroneous, Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023).

¶14 A court may terminate a parent’s rights when: (1) “[t]he child
has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine
months or longer pursuant to court order”; (2) “the parent has substantially
neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the
child to be in an out-of-home placement”; and (3) DCS “made a diligent
effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(a).

¶15 Father does not dispute that termination was in J.G.’s best
interests, that J.G. was in an out-of-home placement for nine months or
longer, or that DCS made a diligent effort to provide him with appropriate
reunification services, so we do not address those issues. See Michael J., 196
Ariz. at 249, ¶ 13; Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377,
¶ 15 n.2 (App. 2010). Instead, Father appears to argue he remedied the
circumstances causing J.G.’s out-of-home placement because he has a place
to live, a job, a car, and childcare.

¶16 Whether a parent substantially neglected or wilfully refused
to remedy the circumstances causing the child’s removal “focuses on the
level of the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent’s
success in actually doing so.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz.
326, 329, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). DCS told Father he needed to have stable
housing and employment to reunite with J.G. But DCS also told Father he
needed to participate in the parenting skills program, domestic violence
counseling, and visitation with J.G. And the superior court found Father
substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances
causing J.G.’s out-of-home placement because he did not complete the
parenting skills program, he refused to visit J.G., and he attended only one

4
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

domestic violence counseling session more than a year after DCS asked him
to self-refer to counseling.

¶17 Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s findings.
Father’s parenting program practitioner testified Father missed most of his
sessions and did not complete the program. Further, Father testified DCS
asked him to self-refer to domestic violence counseling in August 2022, but
he did not start counseling until more than a year later. When Father finally
started counseling, he attended intake and one session and missed the next
five sessions. Father said he could not find a provider that accepted his
insurance, and he missed counseling sessions because his phone would not
connect to the virtual meetings. But the superior court said it did not find
Father’s testimony credible because the court recommended a free
counseling program, he attended intake and one session without issues,
and the counseling center’s records did not support his testimony. We do
not reweigh evidence. See Jordan C., 223 Ariz. 93, ¶ 18. Finally, Father
testified he stopped visiting J.G. in March 2023 because he was “upset” with
DCS for reinstating supervised visitation. Father’s response to DCS’s
requirements is unacceptable for a parent.

¶18 Father does not dispute these findings, but he denies allowing
Mother to see J.G. and claims DCS “intentional[ly] tricked” him into
reinstating supervised visitation. The superior court acknowledged
Father’s denial but cited DCS’s contradicting evidence. “The resolution of
such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the [superior]
court as the trier of fact,” so we defer to the superior court’s judgment. Jesus
M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (citations
omitted). Moreover, nothing in the record supports Father’s claim that DCS
tricked him.

¶19 Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding
that Father neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances
causing J.G.’s out-of-home placement. “If clear and convincing evidence
supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the [superior] court
ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other
grounds.” Id. at 280, ¶ 3 (citations omitted). Thus, we do not address the
six-month ground.

II. Father’s Other Arguments

¶20 Father argues the superior court judge “was unfair” and his
attorney “refuse[d] to represent him.” Father cites no evidence supporting

5
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G.
Decision of the Court

these arguments, and we find none in the record. Accordingly, we do not
address them further.

¶21 Father also argues DCS accused him of drug and sex abuse
“without pro[of].” DCS asked Father to complete testing to rule out
substance abuse. But Father tested negative, DCS did not allege substance
abuse as a ground for terminating his rights, and the court did not terminate
his rights because of substance abuse. Further, the DCS case manager
testified that DCS was not concerned about Father abusing substances.
Thus, DCS did not wrongfully accuse Father of drug abuse, and the court
did not terminate Father’s rights because of drug abuse.

¶22 We also reject Father’s argument we should reverse because
of the sexual abuse allegation. After the contested severance hearing, but
before the court issued its termination order, DCS filed an emergency
motion to suspend Father’s visitation because of reports that Father
sexually abused J.G. The court granted DCS’s motion to suspend visitation
the day after it terminated Father’s parental rights. But the subject of this
appeal is the order terminating Father’s parental rights, and the court did
not reference sexual abuse in that order. Thus, Father’s arguments are
meritless.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

6